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In this article, we explore intimate partner violence (IPV) from an intersectional, feminist 
perspective. We describe how an updated feminist view guides us to a perspective on IPV that is 
more strongly grounded in an anti-oppressive, non-violent, socially just feminist stance than a 
second-wave gender-essential feminist stance that suggests that patriarchy is the cause of IPV. At 
the time we began to work together it seemed that a researcher had to be identified as a “family 
violence” researcher or a “feminist” researcher of violence against women, and that it wasn’t 
possible to be a feminist researcher who looked beyond patriarchy as the cause of IPV. We 
advocate critically thinking about essentialist practices in clinical work so that we can maintain 
an anti-oppressive, socially just, non-violent approach to working with clients who experience 
IPV. 




An Updated Feminist View of Intimate Partner Violence 
 Researchers and clinicians who advocate studying and/or treating females as primary 
perpetrators of intimate partner violence (IPV) or who advocate studying and/or treating couples 
who choose to remain together after experiencing IPV have been labeled “anti-feminist”. In this 
paper, we review the ways feminist theory has changed over the years and how, frequently, when 
feminist theory is criticized or upheld as a guiding theory for understanding IPV, an outdated 
view of feminist theory is used.  Through this review we seek to clarify how it is possible to be a 
“feminist”,  based on a third wave intersectional position that emphasizes social justice and 
advocates for eliminating essentialist practices, while rejecting patriarchy as the primary cause of 
IPV and embracing a variety of explanations and treatment options for individuals and couples in 
violent relationships  Our work is based on a more layered and complex model that “seeks both 
to hold violent partners accountable and to intervene to change couple interaction” (Stith, 
McCollum, & Rosen , 2011, p. 10).  This more nuanced understanding of both treatment options 
and feminisms forms the basis of this paper. 
Patriarchy, referring to the “power of the fathers” (Kesselman, McNair, & Schiedewind, 
2008, p. 10), is “the grand narrative that influences us all, often invisibly” (Dickerson, 2013, p. 
102). It continues to have an important place in understanding some types of IPV. However, the 
historically persistent patriarchal social structure has been offered as the primary explanation of 
IPV (Stark & Flitcraft, 1996; for a discussion of this, see Winstock, 2013). In this paper, when 
we seek to move the field “beyond patriarchy” to discern causes for IPV, we are not seeking to 
move the field “beyond feminism” but to expand our understanding of feminisms. We seek to 
 4 
explore IPV from a feminist, intersectional perspective and advocate for non-violence and social 
justice.  
As two feminists from differing cultural and educational backgrounds, we attempted to 
put into place what Goldner (1998, 1999) called the “both/and” challenge of opposing a sexist 
society and also supporting couples who choose to maintain their union after experiencing IPV.  
The second author was charged with being “anti-feminist” or part of the “backlash” against 
feminism because her research and treatment efforts focus on supporting couples who choose to 
stay together after experiencing IPV. It appeared that some feminists considered the decision to 
leave a violent marriage the only way to take a “feminist” stance in this situation. At the time we 
began to work together we had many debates about whether it was possible to be a “feminist” 
and also study women as primary perpetrators of violence, or couples in which both partners are 
violent, or recommend couples treatment for some couples experiencing IPV.  It seemed that a 
researcher had to be identified as a “family violence” researcher or a “feminist” researcher of 
violence against women, and that it wasn’t possible to be a feminist researcher who looked 
beyond patriarchy as the cause of IPV.   
In this paper, we offer an updated literature review of third wave feminisms that guided 
us to a perspective on IPV that is more strongly grounded in an anti-oppressive, non-violent, 
socially just feminist stance than a second-wave gender-essential feminist stance that suggests 
that patriarchy is the cause of IPV.  Goldner (1998) said more than a decade ago: 
What the feminist perspective brings to the table is a fundamental, ethical and political 
framework with which to view abuse and victimization. On these larger issues, and on the 
question of safety, there must be no compromise or ambiguity. But having established the 
moral bottom line, a zero tolerance for violence and a commitment to safety, 
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accountability, and equity above all else, there should also be room for many voices and 
approaches to this grave and complex problem (p. 267).  
In the years since Goldner’s (1998) paper was published, authors such as Dutton (2006), Hamel 
(2005), Hamel and Nicholls (2007), Heru (2007) and Stith, McCollum and Rosen (2011), among 
others, have emphasized the need to consider the use of violence by both partners and also the 
co-occurrence of psychiatric disorders, substance use and attachment issues in the treatment of 
IPV.  Their work highlights the value of conjoint treatment as a viable treatment option for some 
couples experiencing IPV. However, there is a continued presence of persistent and strident 
dispute over the question of gender in partner violence perpetration and victimization, with 
important treatment implications, which makes a revisiting of feminist ideas necessary, 
particularly the updating of these ideas.  
On the one hand, when Dutton (2006) blames “feminism” for holding back innovation in 
IPV treatment and research, an outdated view of “feminism” is described.  Dutton says, “This 
feminist argument indicates patriarchy as a direct cause of wife assault rather than an inducement 
that interacts with other causes.  Hence the feminist distrust of psychological causes of male 
violence as potentially ‘exonerative’ and the lack of empirical studies of possible interactive 
causes conducted within a feminist perspective” (p. 97).  Thus, Dutton discounts feminist theory 
as essentialist or one-dimensional without recognizing how recent feminist theories allow for a 
more nuanced perspective.   
On the other hand, researchers who report findings indicating that women are often 
violent in relationships have been labeled, “anti-feminists”.  For example, DeKeseredy (2011) 
lumps researchers who report data demonstrating that women are as violent as men with “right-
wing father’s groups and other anti-feminists” (p. 6).  In addition, although DeKeseredy writes 
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that “feminist men and feminist male collectives can make a difference” (p. 119), he immediately 
comes back to a tried ideological position when he says, “More than a lack of knowledge, it is 
men’s unwillingness to change that is problematic, especially men who gain from woman abuse. 
Many men are uncomfortable giving up patriarchal power and are more attracted to participating 
in the anti-feminist backlash” (p. 119).  Such ideological positions, describing feminism as 
blocking innovation in research and treatment and/or labeling researchers who study female 
violence as “anti-feminist,” keep the field frozen and do not permit the kinds of interchanges that 
could make a difference in the lives of individuals and couples.  A more accurate understanding 
of current feminist theories can help bridge the ideological gap.   
 While Dutton’s (2006) and DeKeseredy’s (2011) ideas may seem dated, depending on 
the camp to which the reader might adhere, these ideas continue to be prevalent and demand 
revisiting. An anti-oppressive, socially just feminist stance means that clinicians note the 
unevenness of the distribution and access to power of individuals from various backgrounds and 
contexts and account for it within the therapy situation.  There is already an inherent power 
differential between the therapist and client, and therapists working from a socially just feminist 
stance strive to not replicate the inequality or injustice. We include two case examples 
(disidentified) that illustrate how our intersectional, feminist position informed our decision to 
offer couples treatment to these couples presenting with violence.  
Characterizing the advocacy of couples treatment for IPV as “anti-feminist” stems from 
an ongoing disagreement between researchers identified as belonging to either the “feminist,” or 
“family violence” camp, over the role of gender in IPV. Winstock (2013, p. 400) delineates the 
current controversy as a “false controversy” that is not resolvable.  Rather than dissuade each 
party from their points of view, Winstock identifies several sides to the controversy, based on 
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accepting or rejecting attitudes “regarding the evidence of women’s violence against their 
partners, the relevance of the gender paradigm in partner violence, and the need for an alternative 
paradigm” (p. 407). Such a finely striated depiction of the state of the literature on partner 
violence is still new, even though authors like Goldner (1990, 1998, 1999) and her colleagues 
discussed a both/and perspective decades ago. The idea is still in need of support. 
Furthermore, since conjoint treatment is generally prohibited for court-involved IPV 
offenders due to state standards, the juxtaposition of societal power structures, state standards 
and competent care becomes highly complex. In fact, 81% of state domestic violence offender 
standards prohibit couples counseling for court-involved offenders (Austin & Dankwort, 2003). 
However, there is mounting evidence that both men and women use violence in relationships 
(Archer, 2000; Jose & O’Leary, 2009). Violence occurs in heterosexual and same-sex 
relationships.  If patriarchy (or male privilege) is the primary explanation for IPV, how is female 
violence or violence in same sex relationships understood?  
We found ourselves at odds with the brand of feminism that characterized, not only the 
social policy that required batterer groups for men and support groups for women, but also the 
implication that “most,” if not “all men” were violent and “most,” if not “all women,” were 
victims. Further, troubling was the idea that if we believe that patriarchy also does men a 
disservice, we were letting men “off the hook,” thereby not holding them fully accountable for 
the unearned privileges they receive by being men. In the same way we had concerns with 
batterer intervention standards that prohibit providers from considering psychological 
contributions to male battering behavior. This was similarly seen as helping men to not be 
accountable for their violence (see Dutton, 2006; hooks, 2000; Goldner, 1999). For example, 
while a number of state standards explicitly disapprove of anger management as a primary focus 
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of domestic violence treatment, at least one state (West Virginia, Batterer Intervention 
Prevention Programs in West Virginia, 1992) went so far as to prohibit anger management as 
part of a batterer’s intervention:  
“Anger management” theory and methods are never appropriate for use in batterer 
intervention services as they do not accurately reflect the cause of battering and are a 
reflection of the batterer’s desire to camouflage his choice to batter. Further, anger 
management theory suggests provocation, fails to account for premeditation, diffuses 
responsibility, implies that there is a quick fix, misrepresents the depth of the problem in 
the community, and fully misses the link to the larger issue of sexism and patriarchy. 
(Maiuro & Eberle, 2008, p. 144) 
The idea of a single-factor cause of male violence seemed to beg further exploration, in tandem 
with state standards that generally stem from an assumption of gendered violence. In this paper, 
we present an updated view of feminist thinking that offers room for flexibility in the treatment 
of partner violence. 
A Brief Sketch of Feminist History and a Discussion of Current Feminist Ideas 
 “Feminism is a social movement whose goal is to eliminate the oppression of women in 
all its forms” (Kesselman et al., 2008, p. 3). Much of the strong rhetoric in the IPV literature is 
based on an earlier version of feminism. This seems especially true in the legislative arena 
(Goldner, 1999) which implicated patriarchy as the cause of IPV and that prohibited a multi-
faceted approach to treating IPV which is so prominent in state standards in the U.S. Therefore, 
in this paper, we review the evolution of feminist thought over the years. 
The metaphor of waves has often been associated with evolving ideas in feminism, with 
each wave leading to more nuanced approaches to ending sexism at the inception of the twenty-
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first century. First wave feminism began in mid-18th century with many of the leaders being 
middle and upper class white women, along with a few prominent African-American women 
who agitated for the abolition of slavery, voting rights in the suffrage movement, among other 
political rights such as the right to inherit property (Kesselman et al., 2008). Second wave 
feminism dates back to the mid-twentieth century when the women’s movement went beyond 
advocating for the abolition of slavery to advocating for civil rights and went beyond advocating 
for women’s right to vote to advocating for the end of violence against women. Kesselman (in 
Kesselman et al., 2008, p. 545) writes,  
The tensions that were building in the lives of women in the 1950s and 1960s, however, 
went beyond the need for work outside the home; they had to do with the devaluation of 
women in everyday life, sexual objectification, the violence against women that 
permeated society, and the socialization of women to meet the needs of men. 
However, second wave feminists looked at women's rights without really looking at how race 
intersected with gender, thus making women of color feel left out of the movement. Therefore, 
out of this exclusion, third wave feminism was born to include marginalized people of both 
genders and different races, classes, and sexual orientations (Crenshaw, 1991; Kesselman et al., 
2008; Taylor, 1998). Queer theorists and global feminists also entered the arena and offered 
intersectional perspectives, which made feminism not monolithic but multi-dimensional (Cohen, 
2005; Crenshaw, 1991; hooks, 2000; Mohanty, 2003; Narayan, 2000). The notion of the second 
wave's universalizing idea of sisterhood was replaced with the understanding that while we are 
all women, our experiences within our race, gender, nationality, class and other markers of 
identity make us different and similar, unequal and equal. This evolution of feminism, from 
singular to intersectional, leads to a better understanding of how to view IPV. 
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Crenshaw (1991) is credited with coining the term “intersectionality”. She discouraged 
identifying a problem with a single label like sexism (man/woman) or racism (white/black) 
because such labels end up ignoring difference. For example, bell hooks (2000) describes the 
idea of a poor or working class man who is assumed to reap all the privileges of his gender. She 
writes: 
More than any other male group in the United States, he is constantly concerned about 
the contradiction between the notion of masculinity he was taught and his inability to live 
up to that notion… When he beats or rapes women, he is not exercising privilege or 
reaping positive rewards; he may feel satisfied in exercising the only form of domination 
allowed him… As long as he is attacking women and not sexism or capitalism, he helps 
to maintain a system that allows him few, if any, benefits or privileges… he chooses to 
remain both oppressor and oppressed. (p. 75) 
Although early feminist studies are centered around the experiences of women in particular, later 
feminisms (see Crenshaw, 1991; hooks 2000) extend to men as well. This latter point ends up 
getting obscured in debates about whether IPV is symmetric or asymmetric (DeKeseredy, 2011; 
Dutton, 2006). However, patriarchy has done men a disservice by dictating gender role norms for 
males (Jordan, Kaplan, Miller, Stiver, & Surrey, 1991). This socialization of men is important to 
keep in mind in connection with IPV where men are seen as invulnerable and using their male 
privilege to be violent. Batterer intervention programs often seek to rectify this by making men 
“less tough” through confrontation. Milner (2004) refers to this resocialization as a ‘totalization’ 
of violent men by workers who “not only describe how they are but also presume to know what 
they think” (p. 80)—that men are beyond reach because they are in denial about the impact of 
their violence. Milner also observes that, “group workers operate from a position of self-
 11 
righteous superiority, apparently unaware that they are demonstrating the very attitudes they set 
out to challenge—entitlement, blame and vengeance” (p. 80). Using an intersectional, third-wave 
feminist lens to understand relationship violence leads to an anti-oppression, social justice 
perspective where patriarchy lies beside other oppressive factors as leading to IPV.  
Gender Essentialism and Cultural Essentialism 
When feminist theory began to move  beyond the second wave feminist idea of 
sisterhood to a third wave feminist idea of intersectionality, where other aspects of identity (e.g., 
religion, indigenous heritage, class, sexual orientation, educational level, etc.) are considered, the 
destructive potential of grouping all women or all women within a culture into the same 
universalizing category began to be recognized, as Narayan (2000) cautions. According to 
Narayan, gender essentialism would combine, for instance, the experiences of White women and 
those of Indian women under the category of “all women.” Here, under the single operating 
umbrella of gender, patriarchal norms would subjugate women as a group. Wanting to avoid 
gender essentialism and wanting to respect cultures, one might focus more on the Caucasian 
experience and the Indian experience, such that “all White women” and “all Indian women” 
might be seen to have certain common experiences within their respective group and this would 
lead to a culturally essentialist view. To maintain an intersectional view, which is a third wave 
practice, an extra dimension of sexual orientation could be added and the experiences of White, 
heterosexual women and Indian, lesbian women could be examined, then, race, sexual 
orientation and nationality would be considered in addition to gender, so that the experiences of 
racism, heterosexism, imperialism and patriarchy would be highlighted. Further, it is possible to 
stay open to other unspoken dimensions (e.g., educational level, urban or rural experience, 
indigenous heritage, disability, age, religion, etc.) of the individuals’ experience. In this manner, 
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gender essentialist generalizations about “women” or “women’s problems” are not made. 
Cultural essentialism suggests that there is a collapsing of categories under larger cultural 
categories; such as “all western women,” or “all lesbian women,” “all Native-American 
women,” or “all women of the Middle-East,” whereby particular women are subsumed under a 
larger cultural category or particular women stand in for their culture as a whole. Narayan 
advocates for non-essentialist practices and suggests that, “While gender essentialism often 
conflates socially dominant norms of femininity with the problems, interests and locations of 
actual particular women, cultural essentialism often conflates socially dominant cultural norms 
with the actual values and practices of a culture”(p. 82). 
For example, Sandberg (2013), the chief operating officer of Facebook and ranked on 
Fortune’s list of the 50 Most Powerful Women in Business, described in her bestselling book, 
“Lean In,” how women unintentionally hold themselves back in their careers. In the book she 
asks women to lean in towards opportunity. We could imagine “all women” being told that it is 
okay to lean in and, possibly, “have it all.” This might be seen as a gender essentialist message. 
What it masks, however, is that only the women in the top echelons of power can really lean in 
and that, as Burnham (2013) points out, most women and men “expect to be driven hard, paid 
little, burdened by debt and, eventually, cast aside” (para. 3). In terms of cultural essentialism, 
the cultural messages from India might include, “Traditional women don’t quit their marriages” 
(subtext: don’t quit even when the marriage is abusive); “By making the decision to leave your 
marriage, you are too Americanized” (read: Westernized). The cultural essentialist message is 
that there is a tradition that is largely unspecified, but it is invoked to promote guilt within the 
female partner so that she does not betray the institution of marriage. Tracing the history 
(Narayan, 2000) of “tradition,” however, also results in alternative “traditional” possibilities, 
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such as the strong role of women in India’s long and extensive tradition of argumentativeness 
where they have proved themselves to be more than capable defenders of their wisdom (Sen, 
2005). Also, by characterizing leaving as a “Western” artifact, the traditionalists secure the 
borders of the Western/non-Western binary. So, culturally essentialist messages can also come 
from within a culture to serve oppressive ends.  A similar argument is also made in the West, 
whereby “tradition” is invoked to say that a “strong” woman (or a feminist) would leave an 
unfaithful or violent husband, and that non-modern, (read: traditional, conservative) women 
don’t leave because of their traditionality (or weakness). In this manner, culturally essentialist 
arguments can be used to oppress without taking a closer look at what constitutes a woman’s 
decision-making regarding leaving.  
In another example, Cohen (2005) speaks of getting away from the binary of 
hetero/queer. She identifies that, in contrast to the intersectional analysis of “queer activists of 
color,” 
…the politics of some white queer activists and organizations has come dangerously 
close to a single oppression model. In experiencing “deviant” sexuality as the prominent 
characteristic of their marginalization, these activists begin to envision the world in terms 
of a “hetero/queer” divide. (p. 31) 
In critiquing the hegemony of heteronormativity, Cohen says that these activists “map the power 
and entitlement of normative heterosexuality onto the bodies of all heterosexuals” (p. 31). This 
falls under the cultural essentialist practice defined by Narayan (2000). 
In an effort to nurture non-essentialist practices, clinicians may consider abandoning 
binaries of all sorts, such as “Western/Non-western,” “Gay/Straight,” “Black/White,” 
“Women/Men,” etc. It is more important to seek to understand the people in our offices and to 
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note who is in power, who speaks and who does not. Noticing the fluctuating fields of power 
within an intersectional model will offer a clinician more insight than can any singular, 
essentialist model.  
Binaries tend to create neat borders between groups, borders that can be policed by social 
policy relatively easily. For example, the gender essentialist division between men and women is 
reflected in the social policy that disallows couples therapy when IPV is present; that sends 
women to support groups and men to batterer groups. Patriarchy is the single operating principle 
in this example. Accepting the fact that some violence is symmetrical does not mean that we 
ignore the fact that some violence is, indeed, asymmetrical. However, it is harder to police an 
intersection. Asking police officers to move beyond gender and to consider the actual situation 
they are encountering when they are called to investigate IPV is much more complex than 
teaching them that when they see bilateral violence, they should assume that men are the primary 
aggressors and should be arrested.  
To upend essentialist practice, Narayan (2000) suggests a strategy of tracing histories that 
research how and why a particular cultural practice came to have its existing form. The example 
offered earlier in this paper of what constitutes tradition, of how the word “tradition” can be used 
to oppress from both within and outside one’s culture, is one instance of tracing histories to 
counteract essentialist practice.  
In another instance, research on bilateral violence or violence perpetrated by females or 
reporting data suggesting that women initiate and carry out physical assaults on their partners as 
often as do men (Stith & Straus, 1995), appears to evoke a sense of betrayal among gender 
essentialists who highlight the fact that women are more likely to be severely injured by IPV 
than are men. Among some second wave feminists there is fear in accepting the idea of men 
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being abused by women and they read it as “feminist backlash” (Girard, 2009; Minaker & 
Snider, 2006).  Perhaps their views are justified when DeKeseredy (2011), a feminist researcher 
in Canada reports that:  
The Status of Women Canada (SWC) announced that women’s organizations would no 
longer be eligible for funding for advocacy, government lobbying, or research projects. 
SWC was required to delete the word equality from its list of goals.  A year later, in early 
September 2007, Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper added more fuel to an 
ongoing anti-feminist fire by eliminating funding to the National Association of Women 
and the Law (NAWL), a non-profit women’s group that tackles violence against women 
and other forms of female victimization. (p. 20). 
DeKeseredy offers an excellent example of what happens when essentialist practice leads to 
policy decisions. To use research that shows that violence between men and women takes place 
at about the same rate to make policy decisions about funding and to delete “equality” as a goal 
for anti-violence programs, is to suggest that men and women are already equal and that there is 
no longer a need for equality to be legislated. This is much like saying, “we are now in a post-
racial era because we have an African-American President.” Tracing histories, we know that 
feminism’s goals have not yet been fully realized, despite significant strides that have been made 
towards equality. Misogyny is an old wound, much like racism, and other –isms. Moves of the 
sort DeKeseredy (2011) describes, prolong and persist in maintaining borders between the 
genders and keep in place the institution and performance of patriarchy. From an updated 
feminist perspective, more needs to be done from an intersectional, anti-oppressive stance that 
can address the multifactorial causes of violence and the multitude of victims of violence.  When 
instances of violence against men are identified, services should be made available for them, like 
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any other IPV victim. Recognizing that not all IPV victims are women does not mean that 
services designed to support female IPV victims should be reduced or eliminated. 
There is a similar layer of betrayal felt by some lesbian individuals when researchers 
address violence in same-sex relationships. Merlis and Linville, in their study of the lesbian 
experience, report that, “participants discussed the efforts of the lesbian community to maintain 
its current identity as a romanticized, idealized, “utopian” existence” (2006, p. 105). Barnes 
(2010) and Merlis and Linville (2006), in discussing the “lesbian utopia,” describe the 
disenchantment experienced by victims of violence and their being shamed into secrecy because 
they perceive the violence as the breakage of a covenant. As a result of the violence becoming 
public, they may feel that the lesbian community as a whole is now set back by a further instance 
of pathology. The “lesbian utopia” seems indicative of an essentialist crossroads between gender 
and heteronormativity where women are expected to be gentle partners who should only have to 
fight against a hetero/queer divide. 
Another anti-essentialist strategy is to consider Mohanty’s (2003) idea of solidarity, 
which would entail being willing to have a difficult dialogue across differences and the focus 
would be “simultaneously on individual and collective experiences of oppression and 
exploitation and of struggle and resistance” (p. 522). For example, under the aegis of patriarchy, 
if men and women were willing to have a dialogue and work together to challenge the effects of 
patriarchy, (in which many are engaging and this work is already happening (see Kimmel in 
Kesselman et al., 2008; DeKeseredy, 2011)), then there will be hope for ending sexist 
oppression. Similarly, if oppressor groups and the oppressed along various identity markers were 
willing to dialogue across multiple borders and intersections, then there might be hope of 
offering services to victims of IPV that are non-heterosexist, non-sexist, non-racist, non-classist, 
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non-oppressive.  Extending Mohanty’s (2003) model of solidarity means that clinicians and 
researchers alike, along with individuals in violent relationships must “struggle with themselves 
and each other so that they can “forge informed, self-reflexive solidarities” (p. 530). 
In sum, anti-essentialist practices, questioning hegemony, and advocating feminist 
solidarity across shifting structures of power that affect both women and men are proposed. 
Within this buffeting field of power fluctuations, we are challenged take a critical stance, trace 
histories, and have difficult dialogues across borders/nations. This makes feminist analysis 
intersectional.  
Applying A Feminist Intersectional Perspective to Clinical Work 
How does all this translate to clinical work in family therapy? The various markers of 
identity (race, class, gender, sexual orientation, nationality, disability, etc.) are not independent, 
separate systems of oppression (Collins, 2000), rather, “intersectionality explores how these 
systems mutually construct one another” (p. 157). In this manner, Bishop (2002), Collins (2000), 
and Goldner (1999) offer a stance that can be very helpful in clinical work where the playing 
field is not seen as level for everyone, but as uneven and shifting.  
Goldner (1999) and her colleagues (Goldner et al., 1990) have written extensively on the 
configuration of the power structure in the therapy room where the system of the couple interacts 
with the social system of patriarchy and gender and the power differential of the therapist-client 
relationship. These ideas connect with the ones articulated by Walker and Rosen (2004) where 
they build on the model of relational-cultural theory as an “elaborated understanding of 
connection” (p. 4) and that “all power, including destructive power, is created by and depends 
upon relationship” (Walker, 2008, p. 135). Of particular import for the discussion of feminist 
concepts and a reframing of dominant psychological stances, is Walker & Rosen’s (2004) 
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description of a power-over culture: 
…is one where those with more power act in ways that maintain the power differential, 
undermining any movement that threatens the status quo. Moreover, the powerful behave 
in ways that engender conflict but simultaneously move to suppress its expression in 
relationship. The powerful oppose movement towards shared power while obscuring the 
function and intent of their actions. Traditional psychotherapies arise from this larger 
culture….the whole therapy arrangement augments the therapist’s power and can easily 
replicate the functions of the power-over culture from which it arises. (pp. 13-14) 
The therapist and the client “bring with them not only their personal developmental histories but 
also the cultural history of the groups with which they are socially identified” (p. 18). In this 
therapeutic system, the therapist, working from a relational cultural frame, will be attentive to the 
power dynamics within the therapeutic field and strategies of disconnection that might arise in 
the negotiation of power within that encounter. Additionally, the therapist will need to be attuned 
to the power dynamics between the couple, whether it is egalitarian or hierarchical (Silverstein, 
Bass, Tuttle, Knudson-Martin, & Huenergardt, 2009; for a narrative, anti-oppressive perspective, 
see Dickerson, 2013), how it is informed by each partner’s cultural experience (individually and 
as a couple) and what strategies of connection or disconnection they use to stay engaged or leave 
the relationship. Both partners are encouraged to “discover ways to maintain a healthy balance 
between separateness/independence and togetherness in their relationship” (Jenkins, 1990, p. 
112) and to respect each other’s independence.  
Goldner et al. (1990) suggested that a relational bond keeps conflictual partners together 
so that “abuse and coercion coexist with understanding and friendship in a unique and painful 
way” (p. 363). In sum, we consider our power as therapists, our own cultural histories as they are 
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embodied in the therapy room, the fluctuations of power dynamics between partners, their 
relational bond and their cultural histories and how all these experiences come to bear upon the 
therapeutic alliance between the couple and their therapist. We consider all this as we seek to 
offer an anti-oppressive, socially just, non-violent couples therapy.  
Case Example 1: Mary and Bob 
Mary (32) and Robert (34) (pseudonyms) are a Caucasian couple who lived in a middle-class 
area of a major metropolitan area.  They met while they were in college and both of them had 
serious drinking problems earlier in their relationship.  At the time they came to the specialized 
couples treatment program for domestic violence in which the second author supervised, they felt 
confident that they each had their drinking under control, but they were concerned about the high 
level of conflict and violence in the home. They had two children, ages 3 and 5.  Both Mary and 
Bob grew up in homes with high levels of violence and both found themselves using violence in 
their relationship.  Bob’s violence was most frightening to the children and Mary talked about 
being afraid of Bob’s violence.  Bob reported that he was not afraid of Mary but that he was not 
going to let her be violent to him, without being violent in return. He said that he had been raised 
to fight back and would not let Mary push him around. They had talked with their pastor about 
couples counseling and had called several local therapists before coming to our program. In 
every case, the professionals they reached out to said that they would not work with a couple in 
which there had been violence. Using a second wave feminist perspective, they assumed that 
Bob was the primary aggressor and that Mary was a victim of Bob’s violence. Bob and Mary 
were encouraged to separate and Mary was encouraged to go to a shelter and Bob to a batterer’s 
intervention program, but Bob and Mary were both clear that they wanted to try to make the 
marriage work and did not want to separate.  We decided to conduct an assessment and to learn 
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more about their stories before determining if they were appropriate for couples treatment.  
 Before beginning conjoint treatment, they completed a series of measures, including the 
Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS2; Straus, Hamby, Bony-McCoy, & Sugarman, 1996) and individual 
interviews to learn about the level of violence and each partner’s role in the violence.  Through 
the assessment, we learned that each of them reported initiating violence in their relationships 
and that their reports of violence used and received were fairly congruent.  Both reported 
throwing things at their partner, kicking, and hitting.  They both reported perpetrating severe 
psychological abuse and they had both received bruises from their partner’s violence.  Mary 
reported more frequent injuries in response to Bob’s violence, and as previously indicated, more 
fear in response to the violence. However, they both took responsibility for their own violence 
and they each wanted to change their own behavior and to try to make the marriage work.   
They were accepted into and participated in an 18-week program that involved co-
therapists who, at times, worked with them as individuals and at times worked conjointly with 
them.  Each week they met separately with one of the therapists so that the therapists could 
conduct an assessment of whether or not violence had recurred.  They worked together to 
develop a negotiated time-out.  In the sixth week of the program, Bob reported that Mary was 
angry when she came home from the store and found that he was playing videogames on the 
computer and not watching the children.  He reported that she yelled at him and called him, 
“good for nothing”.  He recognized that he was becoming defensive and angry, but he did 
something new, he called a time-out. She did something new and she allowed him to separate 
from her so that they could both calm down.  After their planned hour apart, he came back to her 
and apologized for not being responsible in watching the children.  They both reported this 
incident was a turning point in helping them develop a new, more egalitarian, and more calm 
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relationship.  Had we used a more gender essentialist framework, we may have chosen to view 
Bob as the primary aggressor and as needing batterer intervention rather than couples treatment: 
a stance that seems to us as an example of how public policy can establish a simplistic, non-
systemic, one-size-fits-all solution.  Using an intersectional position, we examined various 
aspects of each of their identities and chose to offer services requested by each partner and not 
assume that we had more knowledge of what they needed than did they.  At six-month follow-up 
they each reported no additional physical violence and reduced psychological aggression.   
Case Example 2: Susan and Jesus 
Susan (28) and Jesus (35) (pseudonyms) were an interracial couple (Caucasian wife, Latino 
husband) with two children, a thirteen-year old son and a three-year old daughter, who were 
referred for therapy by a local foster care agency. Both children were in foster care and as part of 
the couple’s effort to regain parenting rights when they were referred for couples therapy. 
Additionally, there was documented severe IPV (Jesus to Susan) and Jesus’s drug possession and 
driving while intoxicated had recently landed him in jail. Traditional treatment (Jesus went to a 
batterer’s group and Susan went to a support group) had failed because the couple wanted to stay 
together post treatment, despite restraining orders and the threat of losing their children. 
Additionally both were unemployed. I, the first author, was the therapist in this case.  It was 
important for me to be aware of how my cultural identity (middle class, feminist, Indian 
American, in an interracial marriage) fit with the clients’ cultural identities (interracial marriage, 
low socio-economic status). The partners also had strong traditional views about gender roles. 
Jesus said that he did not believe he had the right to hit his wife, but wanted her to accept his 
authority and Susan believed that a woman deserved to be beaten in some instances. As a 
therapist, it was unclear to me how Jesus came to believe that his violence was not justified, 
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whether his belief arose in his family of origin, or from social desirability, or whether he had 
learned it in a batterer’s group. I did come to understand Susan’s views as having emerged in her 
family of origin. 
The couple’s narrative was that they had a harmonious relationship that broke apart due 
to infidelity and trauma that led to Jesus abusing drugs and becoming violent. They felt labeled 
as “incompetent parents.” The caseworker believed that Susan did not know how to be a mother 
despite attending parenting classes. She said that Susan was of low intelligence, did not want to 
leave her batterer and chose him over her children and that she was neglectful of her children. 
The caseworker thought she was too intent to please people, especially men. This 
characterization sounded curiously similar to Milner’s (2004) experience with a client where she 
noted,  
…she [the client] was expected to choose between her partner and her children. If she 
failed to make the ‘right’ choice, she was constructed as ‘failing to protect,’ rather than as 
a woman in need of support…None of her needs were considered as valid in comparison 
with the assumed needs of her children. (pp. 84-85) 
From a second-wave feminist perspective, one can say that Jesus was the one who held 
the pathology and that he should be required to participate in a batterers group while Susan 
participated in a victim support group. He used his prerogative as a male to exercise violence and 
demonstrated his privilege of fallen apartness to justify his use of illegal drugs and violence. One 
can understand the rationale behind the domestic violence workers who encouraged Susan to 
leave Jesus. This is also what Susan’s former therapists, caseworkers and family constantly told 
her to do. Susan was simply unwilling to make this choice and ended up feeling alienated. Milner 
(2004) refers to the work of Scourfield (2003) who found that men were constructed negatively 
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within child protection work and social work. In terms of assessment, men were constructed as 
“a threat to the well-being of both women and children” (Milner, 2004, p. 84; italics in original) 
and in terms of social workers’ views, men were seen as “no use, not contributing to the 
children’s well-being in any way” (p. 85, italics in original). In addition, they often made “the 
decision not to work with a violent man because it was his wife’s job to leave him and protect 
her children” (p. 85), thereby rendering him as irrelevant. These same terms (a threat, no use, 
irrelevant) could be used to describe Jesus. Milner said, “These constructions not only leave 
women with the responsibility for protecting their children” (p. 85) despite their locations in 
positions of less power but also accuse them of being selfish for not putting the children’s needs 
ahead of their own.  
The children were unsafe, however, I was not sure at what point they became unsafe. I 
wondered if they might have been deemed unsafe if Susan and Jesus were more socially mobile 
and had more financial resources or more capacity to hide the lack of safety of the children. 
Susan and Jesus faced stresses from their racial and socio-economic status; they were poor, 
unemployed, in an interracial marriage in a mostly white town, with mixed race children and 
both had attachment injuries from their past. I wondered if their portraiture as “lacking 
intelligence” and “unfit parents” implied that being seen as intelligent meant that they were 
willing to conform to the social service agency’s picture of “good parents.” I say this while 
recognizing that parents’ lack of attunement towards their children is deleterious for the 
children’s development, and I also think that the mental health system’s lack of attunement 
towards the parents exacerbated the family’s struggle for functionality.  
A further piece of the puzzle was Susan’s disenchantment with one of her former 
therapists who had advised her to be “assertive” with a caseworker who supervised her visits 
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with the children.  
Susan: __M__ (former therapist) said that I need to be more assertive with 
___(caseworker). But I was scared to do it. Once, I tried, and I got a look from her 
and that frightened me. So, I stopped.  
Th: (I didn’t want to take sides and I didn’t want to get triangulated. If I supported 
Susan, then it casts M in a negative light. Yet, I wanted to maintain a validating 
stance. I also remembered that much of Susan’s history was a history of trying to 
be acceptable, of being discounted). I am not sure what M said or meant or what 
his (her) context was. But I do understand that when I put myself in your shoes, I 
can see how you might have been nervous about being assertive with 
[caseworker] when she had all that power over the kids. 
Susan: That’s exactly right. I thought I would just try to get along so I can get to visit my 
kids. 
As therapists, we may try not to get triangulated, an impulse emerging from a traditional 
power-over psychotherapy paradigm. Susan’s behavior could have been seen as (1) un-assertive 
and therefore un-feminist and too people pleasing or (2) further evidence of her extreme level of 
dependency.  
From an intersectional perspective, we note that Jesus did have male privilege; however, 
he seemed to be powerless against his internalized image as an abused Latino male, yearning for 
attention from his parents, his hopeless depression and use of drugs and alcohol to self-medicate, 
and his deficits in communication skills, possibly as a result of early attentional failures. His low 
socio-economic status and experience of racism were strains on an already strong system of 
disempowerment. As for Susan, she had learned that she did not count and could get a sense of 
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worth only by being available to men. How could she be angry or manage conflict when she felt 
so invisible and afraid? She tried to resist the violence meted out by Jesus by hitting back, but it 
escalated the violence. In one instance, a drunken Jesus pushed Susan into the couch and Susan 
retaliated by kicking him as hard as she could. This infuriated Jesus and he moved forward and 
tried to strangle Susan. Her strategy of resistance was doomed to fail for she was fighting back 
someone who was seriously under the influence of drugs and alcohol. In another instance, Susan 
called Jesus a “nothing,” a term that incited his feelings of being rejected and he threatened to 
leave. Susan blocked his leaving and it resulted in another physical attack. 
Susan and Jesus participated in couples treatment for about six months. The treatment 
was based on a model developed by Stith et al. (2011), in addition to using the sobriety contract 
developed by O’Farrell and Fals-Stewart (2006). Jesus and Susan completed a series of 
measures, including the CTS2 (Straus, Hamby, Bony-McCoy, & Sugarman, 1996) and individual 
interviews to learn about the level of violence and each partner’s role in the violence.  Both 
reported initiating violence in their relationship and their reports of violence used and received 
were fairly congruent. Susan and Jesus met separately with the therapist at the beginning and 
ending of each session to assess for safety, to plan for the session and the week to come. At the 
pre-session meetings, they were taught and practiced a mindfulness activity so that they were 
able to enter into the session calmly. They developed a vision of a non-violent healthy 
relationship, and put in place actions that made sense to them to make this vision a reality.  They 
were taught and learned to put in place a negotiated time-out in which they developed a strategy 
to recognize when anger was beginning to escalate and a way to safely separate and then re-
connect. This intervention seemed to be key as both reported that being able to safely separate 
and reconnect was crucial to their maintaining a non-violent position in the relationship. Each 
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week they discussed the sobriety contract that they developed in the first session and they held 
daily trust discussions in their home.  If I (first author) had cast the violence as only 
asymmetrical (male-to-female violence) I might have missed the significance of Susan’s physical 
and emotional abuse towards Jesus. To cast the violence as only symmetrical or bilateral would 
mean that we could potentially miss the severity of Jesus’ violence, particularly under the 
influence of substances. There is no substitute for continuous assessment as safety was assessed 
every session. At the end of treatment the couple reported that Jesus’ commitment to sobriety, 
their learning how to put in place a negotiated time-out, their attempt at maintaining a 
rudimentary meditation practice, and their experience of feeling heard without judgment helped 
them develop a non-violent relationship. Being able to talk about racism and unemployment in-
session also helped create a strong therapeutic alliance. 
Conclusion 
 Most state Batterer Intervention Program standards used to develop and structure 
programs for IPV offenders were developed using a second wave feminist perspective as the 
guiding framework. An essentialist position that assumes that patriarchy is the overarching cause 
of IPV, that men are almost always the primary aggressors and that gender resocialization should 
be a key factor in treating all offenders, should be replaced with third wave, intersectional, 
socially just, feminist position. A third wave feminist perspective would move beyond one-size-
fits-all program policies and interventions.  In making this change, treatment providers or court 
officers will need to assess each offender to determine appropriate intervention(s). 
It is likely that many family therapists are treating couples who struggle with IPV since it 
is highly prevalent in high conflict couples, and only a small percentage of these couples are 
court involved (Siegel, 2013). Using Stith et al.’s (2011) research-informed method for treating 
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couples in violent relationships as the guiding model with feminist, intersectional underpinnings 
means that we have to be alert to moments of connection and disconnection within the 
therapeutic frame where socio-cultural narratives might surface along with the narratives of 
violence, power, coercion and relational bonds. Of course, other models also focus on the power 
differential between partners and between the couple and their therapist, but it is also important 
to focus on the multidimensional nature of power as it is experienced in the therapeutic field. It is 
important to be aware of gender and culturally essentialist conclusions, such as staying open to 
the dominant narrative of unilateral male violence with instances of bilateral violence. It is also 
important to acknowledge that we live in a patriarchal society and, rather than blaming, stay 
“attuned to listen for other aspects of the relationship that are preferred, that perhaps lie 
alongside patriarchal influences” (Dickerson, 2013, p. 103). Staying clear of binaries, tracing the 
history of violence and cultural messages with a particular couple, making non-violence an 
explicit part of the treatment, addressing violence using an evidence-informed method, layering 
the treatment focus as attentive to the shifting power structures, and maintaining an anti-
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